A major battle between the Lamanites, under the command of Zerahemnah (a dissenting Zoramite), and the Nephites, under the command of captain Moroni, culminated along the river Sidon at hill Riplah. At this location, in about 74 B.C., the Lamanites anticipated “that they might commence an attack near hill Riplah upon the weaker part of the people” in the land of Manti, but the Lord forewarned Alma of their intent (Alma 43:22–26). The land of Manti was to the south of the valley of Gideon, thus placing the hill Riplah toward the south of this prominent valley (see The Head of the River Sidon and Hill Manti, above). And hill Riplah was “on the east of the river Sidon” (Alma 43:27, 31, 35; 49:16). Chapters 43 and 44 of the book of Alma are devoted to a meticulously accounting of this military conflict, including numerous geographical details of the battleground positions around hill Riplah, the river Sidon and the surrounding valleys. We suggest readers view the video presentation, Moroni’s Military Strategy around HIll Riplah, on our web site.

There was a valley “on the east, and on the south of the hill Riplah” where Lehi, under the command of captain Moroni, “concealed” his half of the Nephite army to await the arrival of the Lamanite forces approaching from the east, on the north of the hill, where they intended to cross the river Sidon at that point (Alma 43:31, 35). This valley, extending “on the east, and on the south of the hill Riplah,” would have had a width, a depth and a length sufficient to sequester several thousand soldiers. And the valley would need to be positioned precisely as the record states, such that Lehi could spring his troops quickly from their hidden location and encircle “the Lamanites about on the east in their rear” (Alma 43:35; 49:16). This valley, stretching around two sides of the hill, would have been sufficiently large to conceal Lehi’s troops from the advancing Lamanites, yet close enough for the army to move out of the hidden valley in a surprise maneuver.

An unnamed valley was located to the west of hill Riplah on the other side of the river Sidon. Before encountering the approaching Lamanite army, captain Moroni “caused that his army should be secreted in [this] valley which was near the bank of the river Sidon, which was on the west of the river Sidon in the wilderness” (Alma 43:27). From this hidden valley on the west, Moroni unleashed his troops to meet the Lamanite army crossing the river Sidon from the east. As noted, the Lamanite army was being pursued by Lehi’s half of the army on the east of hill Riplah after surprising the Lamanites from the rear when they unexpectedly emerged from the concealed valley “on the east, and on the south of the hill Riplah” (Alma 43:31).

The river Sidon was flanked by banks or ridges on the west of the river at this hill Riplah battlefield location (Alma 43:27, 40, 51). Captain Moroni’s forces tactically entrapped the Lamanite army between these banks on the west of the river Sidon and hill Riplah on the east, leading to a surrender of the Lamanite army (Alma 43:50–54; 44:1–23). These banks appear to be of a sufficient height and configuration that they would have been too difficult to scale by entrapped troops. We suggest these high banks could still be identified today near a hill matching the geographical details of a hill Riplah and with a suitably matching river Sidon flowing between the two terrain features.

The terrain of any proposed hill Riplah and river Sidon should not only match these recorded valley, hill and bank configurations and locations, but also provide befitting battlegrounds that would accommodate the precise directions of troop movements and the numerous crossings of the river Sidon in quick succession by the opposing armies. The necessity of hiding troops in valleys implies the natural vegetation of the region could not provide sufficient cover for concealing the Nephite army. We suggest this area of the river Sidon was an open, but rugged landscape, with few trees, but with many hidden arroyos. Arroyos are steep-sided ravines and gullies cut by running water that could provide hiding places for large numbers of troops and could not be seen unless stumbled upon.